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Protection of Intellectual Property
Rights in Computers and Computer
Programs: Recent Developments
ALAN C. ROSE*
The following article examines the protection offered to computers and
computer programs, under the various applicable patent, copyright and
trade secret laws. Concerning patent protection; the author discusses the
history and current status of the patent laws, and analyzes in detail the
landmark case of Diamond v. Diehr. Discussed also is an analysis of
copyright protection for computer programs, offered by the 1980 amend-
ments to section 117 of the 1976 Copyright Act; which paved the way for the
increased protection.
I. INTRODUCTION
The extent of protection given to intellectual property rights en-
compassed by computers and computer programs has recently
been redefined by both the Congress of the United States and the
Supreme Court. Two events of major significance in the protec-
tion of computer software and firmware have occurred during the
last eighteen months. The first, which occurred in December of
1980, was a major statutory change in the federal copyright laws
* B.S. Dartmouth College and Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1948;
J.D. George Washington University, 1951. Member. State Bar of California; Ameri-
can Bar Association; American Patent Law Association. Mr. Rose is a recognized
author in the Patent, Licensing, and Copyright fields. He is currently in private
practice in Los Angeles, California.
relating to computer programs.' The second was the first modern
decision of the United States Supreme Court to uphold claims in-
volving computers or computer programs. In this case, Diamond
v. Diehr,2 the Court held that patent claims to an industrial pro-
cess were not unpatentable merly because they included com-
puter program steps.3
With the proliferation of computers and computer programs in
the last twenty years, it was inevitable that many computer-re-
lated patent applications would be filed in the United States Pat-
ent and Trademark Office. However, computer cases are not
easily accommodated by the Patent and Trademark Office. Com-
puters are very complex, and as such, patent applications for
them often have many sheets of drawings and written descrip-
tions or specifications which are also lengthy. These patent appli-
cations require many hours of a patent examiner's time. It has
also been felt by many that computer programs are better subject
to copyright than patent protection. However, the copyright law
concerning computer programs was in a similar state of uncer-
tainty, consequently, neither patent nor copyright law satisfacto-
rily protected the intellectual property encompassed in
computers and computer programs.
This article will analyze the recent changes in the patent and
copyright laws, giving first an introduction to the nature and
structure of computers and computer programs for which protec-
tion is being sought, followed by a brief overview of the history of
patent protection and copyright protection leading to the present
state of the law in both areas. Included in this discussion will be
a brief review of the protection offered under the umbrella of
trade secrecy, and a discussion of possible federal preemption
problems in this area.
II. HISTORICAL AND DEFINITIONAL OVERVIEW-COMPUTERS AND
COMPUTER PROGRAMS
Intellectual property for which applicants seek protection by
patents and copyrights can be embodied both in computer pro-
grams, known as software, 4 and electrical circuits of the com-
puters themselves, known as "hardware" or 'frmware," 5 and also
1. 17 U.S.C. § 117 (1980).
2. 450 U.S. 175 (1981).
3. Id. For further discussion, see notes 46-51 iftyra and accompanying text.
4. Software is normally employed in the operation of a general purpose com-
puter which performs calculations or other functions in accordance with instruc-
tions included in the program. "A program is a set of instructions for carrying out
prearranged operations on data by use of processing equipment." In re Ghiron,
442 F.2d 985, 986 (C.C.P.A. 1971).
5. Computer hardware consists of all of the machinery which is part of the
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in the microprocessing chips used in many modem day com-
puters.6 These microprocessors have expanded the computer
field tremendously. They have revolutionized the small, special
purpose computer business by making computers available at a
low cost, with the only change in circuitry being a different, inex-
pensively programmable "Read Only Memory Chip."7
A. Historical and Definitional Overview of Patent Protection
Software, firmware, and microprocessors must be either pat-
ented or copyrighted in order to give applicants statutory protec-
tion for their original contributions in these fields. There are
three avenues of protection available to the applicant wishing to
protect intellectual property embodied in software, firmware, and
microprocessors: trade secret protection, copyright protection,
and patent protection.
The Constitution grants Congress broad power to legislate to
"promote the Progress of Science and the Useful Arts, by secur-
ing for limited times to authors and inventors the exclusive rights
to their respective writings and discoveries."8 The patent laws9
provide protection by offering inventors exclusive rights for a lim-
ited period as an incentive for their inventiveness and research
efforts lo Section 101 of the Patent Act of 1952 provides that "Who-
ever invents or discovers any new or useful process, machine,
manufacture of composition of matter, or any new and useful im-
provement thereof, may obtain a patent therefor ... "11 The rel-
computer system. This includes the central processing, input-output control sys-
tems, input-output devices, and various types of memory systems. Comment, Pro-
tection of Computer Software-A Hard Problem, 26 DRAKE L REV. 180, 180 n.1
(1976-77).
6. These microprocessor chips can perform the functions of many special
purpose computers, with the only change being the substitution of a new program
included in a small memory chip forming part of the small electronic package. Ac-
cordingly, the cost of these new special purpose computers can be greatly reduced
as compared with the prior hard-wired special computers.
7. It is these Read Only Memory or ROM chips which may be substituted
into a microprocessor to perform the various special purposes.
8. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
9. 35 U.S.C. § 101 et. seq. (1976).
10. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 307 (1980). Congress legislates in a
patent area so that "the productive effort thereby fostered will have a positive ef-
fect on society through the introduction of new products and processes of manu-
facture into the economy, and the emanations by way of increased employment
and better lives for our citizens." Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470,
480-81 (1974).
11. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1976).
evant legislative history of section 101 also supports the broad
protection offered by the wording of the statute. The original pat-
ent act of 1793, authored by Thomas Jefferson,12 defined statutory
subject matter as "any new or useful art, machine manufacture,
or composition of subject matter, or any new or useful improve-
ment thereof.' 3 In 1952, when the patent laws were codified by
Congress, the word "art" was changed to "process," but otherwise
the original language was left intact.' 4 The Committee Report ac-
companying the 1952 Act notes that Congress intended patentable
subject matter to "include anything under the sun that is made by
man."
15
However, limits upon patentability appear in the 1952 statute.
These limits are also reflected in the case law of the past twenty
years interpreting the statute. More specifically, section 103 of the
1952 Act provides that a patent may not be obtained, despite the
provision of sections 10116 and 102,17 if the subject matter of the
12. Act of Feb. 21, 1793, ch. 11, § 1, 1 Stat. 318, amended by 35 U.S.C. § 101
(1976).
13. Id.
14. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1976). Very briefly, the patent statute presupposes three
standards for patentability of inventions: novelty, utility and nonobviousness to
the skilled artisan. For further information concerning patentability, see Pope &
Pope, Protection of Proprietary Interests in Computer Software, 30 ALA. L. REV.
527, 539 (1979).
15. 447 U.S. at 309. (quoting from S. REP. No. 1979, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 5
(1952)). One of the earliest reported decisions in which the question of software
patentability was at issue was Ex parte King, 146 U.S.P.Q. 590 (Pat. Off. Bd. App.
1964). In King the combination of a computer program and the computer in which
it was stored during operation was held unpatentable because the claims on ap-
peal "merely set forth the result or function accomplished by any computer oper-
ating on data" in a certain known type of mathematical notation. Id. at 591.
However, the decision indicated that the combination of a computer and a novel
stored program could be patentable subject matter if defined to distinguish from
the known prior operation of a general purpose computer.
16. For the text of § 101 see note 14 supra and accompanying text.
17. 35 U.S.C. § 102 (1976) provides in full:
A person shall be entitled to a patent unless
a) the invention was known or used by others in this country, or pat-
ented or described in a printed publication in this or a foreign country,
before the invention thereof by the applicant for a patent, or
b) the invention was patented or described in a printed publication in
this or a foreign country or in public use or on sale in this country, more
than one year prior to the date of the application for a patent in the
United States, or
c) he has abandoned the invention, or
d) the invention was first patented or caused to be patented, or was the
subject of an inventor's certificate by the applicant or his legal representa-
tives or assigns in a foreign country prior to the date of the application for
patent in this country on an application for patent or inventor's certificate
filed more than twelve months before the filing of the application in the
United States, or
e) the invention was described in a patent granted on an application for
patent by another filed in the United States before the invention thereof
by the applicant for patent, or on an international application by another
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patent as a whole would have been "obvious at the time the in-
vention was made to a person having ordinary skill"18 in the art to
which the subject matter pertains.
Supreme Court cases interpreting the 1952 patent statute ap-
peared to ignore its nonobviousness standard. Instead, it seemed
that mere unobviousness was not enough for patentability, but
that an invention had to have "synergism" 19 or "invention" 20
above and beyond the unobviousness test which Congress had ar-
ticulated in the statute. The Supreme Court justices were know-
ledgeable in the antitrust field, and their antimonopoly approach
appeared to carry over into the area of patents, regardless of the.
negative effects of such decisions on inventions and research and
development. In part, because of the anti-patent negativism of
the Supreme Court during the 1960's and 1970's, and the prece-
dent-following decisions by lower courts, inventive effort and re-
search and development activities in the United States were
reduced.21 Also, larger numbers of U.S. patents were being
who has fulfilled the requirements of paragraphs (1), (2), and (4) of sec-
tion 371(c) of this title before the invention thereof by the applicant for
patent, or
f) he did not himself invent the subject matter sought to be patented, or
g) before the applicant's invention thereof, the invention was made in
this country by another who had not abandoned, suppressed, or concealed
it. In determining priority of invention there shall be considered not only
the respective dates of conception and reduction to practice of the inven-
tion, but also the reasonable diligence of one who was first to conceive and
last to reduce to practice, from a time prior to conception by writing.
18. 35 U.S.C. § 103 (1976). This statutory standard of unobviousness has gener-
ated much confusion and discussion by scholars in the field. For a very thorough
discussion of this area, see generally J. WrrHERSPOON, NONOBVIOUSNESS-THE UL-
TIMATE CONDrrION OF PATENTABILITY (J. Witherspoon ed. 1980).
19. Sakraida v. Ag Pro, Inc., 425 U.S. 273, 279 (1976). The Court describes syn-
ergism in the following passage:
We cannot agree that the combination of these old elements to produce an
abrupt release of water directly on the barn floor from storage tanks or
pools can properly be described as synergistic, that is "resulting in an ef-
fect greater than the sum of the several effects taken separately" quoting
from Anderson's-Black Rock v. Pavement Salvage Co., Inc., 396 U.S. 57, 61
(1969) . . .Such combinations are not patentable under standards appro-
priate for a combination patent.
425 U.S. at 282.
20. Anderson's-Black Rock v. Pavement Salvage Co., Inc., 396 U.S. 57, 62-63
(1969). The Anderson Court articulated the invention standard for patentability
holding that to "those skilled in the art, the use of the old elements in a new com-
bination was not an invention by the obvious-nonobviousness standard ... more
than (a successful commercial venture) is needed for invention " Id-
21. The President's Commission on the Patent System rejected the proposal
that computer programs be patentable in a 1966 report entitled "To Promote the
Progress of... Useful Arts." In this report the Commission noted that "the crea-
granted to foreign inventors than in previous years (thirty-seven
percent in 1980 as compared with twenty percent in 1960),22 and
the United States lag in technological leadership became a com-
mon topic in Washington and elsewhere across the nation.
Several Supreme Court patent decisions in recent years involv-
ing computers and computer programs have denied the patenta-
bility of computer programs.23 The first recent case of note was
Gottschalk v. Benson.24 In that case, the Supreme Court was
dealing with a method or process for converting binary coded dec-
imal numbers into pure binary numbers, wholly within the com-
puter.2 5 The Court held that this algorithm, or mathematical
formula, was akin to the discovery of a law of nature, such as the
tion of programs has undergone substantial and satisfactory growth in the absence
of patent protection and that copyright protection is currently available." PRESI-
DENT'S COMMISSION ON THE PATENT SYSTEM, To PROMOTE THE PROGRESS OF . . .
USEFUL ARTS 13 (1966).
22. L.A. Times, June 19, 1981, § 4, at 2, col. 1.
23. Not unexpectedly, many patent applications were rejected in the Patent
Office as not being directed to statutory subject matter. On the other hand, the
CCPA took a more positive view of the patentability. Judge Giles S. Rich, of the
CCPA, had been a member of the drafting committee of the 1952 patent statute.
Accordingly, it was not surprising that the CCPA reversed many of the decisions
of the Patent Office Board of Appeals and found patentable subject matter in com-
puters and computer programming areas. As will be discussed in the article, the
Supreme Court decisions, which had been markedly negative on patentability,
have undergone some change in the last eighteen months.
24. 409 U.S. 63 (1972).
25. The decimal system uses as digits the 10 symbols 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, and
9. The value represented by any digit depends, as it does in any positional system
of notation, both on its individual value and on its relative position in the numeral.
Decimal numerals are written by placing digits in the appropriate positions or col-
umns of the numerical sequence, i.e., "unit" (100), "tens" (101), "hundreds" (102),
"thousands" (103), etc. Accordingly, the numeral 1492 signifies (1 X 103) + (4 x
102) + (9 x 101) + (2 x 100).
The pure binary system of positional notation uses two symbols as digits, 0 and
1, placed in a numerical sequence with values based on consecutively ascending
powers of two. In pure binary notation, what would be the tens position is the
twos position; what would be hundreds position is the fours position; what would
be the thousands position is the eights. Any decimal number from 0 to 10 can be
represented in the binary system with four digits or positions as indicated in the
following table.
Shown as the sum of powers of 2
Decimal 23 22 21 20 Pure Binary
0 = 0 + 0 + 0 + 0 = 0000
1 = 0 + 0 + 0 + 20 = 0001
2 = 0 + 0 + 21 + 0 f 0010
3 = 0 + 0 + 21 + 20 f 0011
4 = 0 + 22 + 0 + 0 - 0100
5 = 0 + 22 + 0 + 20 = 0101
6 = 0 + 22 + 21 + 0 = 0110
7 = 0 + 22 + 21 + 20 = 0111
8 = 23 + 0 + 0 + 0 = 1000
9 = 23 + 0 + 0 + 20 = 1001
10 = 23 + 0 + 21 + 0 = 1010
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law of gravity, 26 and therefore was not patentable subject
matter.
2 7
The next Supreme Court computer case, Dann v. Johnston,28 in-
volved a process of using a computer in bookkeeping operations.
The Court sidestepped the question of statutory subject matter,
and quite summarily held the claims to be unpatentable due to
the existence of prior bookkeeping systems.29
The third case was Parker v. Flook,30 where the process in
question related to a catalytic chemical conversion with an al-
gorithm or formula, so that the final step of the process adjusted
an "alarm limit"31 to a calculated new value. The Court, applying
The Binary Coded Decimal (BCD) system using decimal numerals replaces the
character for each component decimal digit in the decimal numeral with the corre-
sponding four-digit binary numeral, shown in the right-hand column of the table.
Thus, decimal 53 is represented as 0101 0011 in BCD, because decimal 5 is equal to
binary 0101 and decimal 3 is equivalent to binary 0011. In pure binary notation,
however, decimal 53 equals binary 110101. The conversion of BCD numerals to
pure binary numerals can be done mentally through use of the foregoing table.
The method sought to be patented varies the ordinary arithmetic steps a human
would use by changing the order of the steps, changing the symbolism for writing
the multiplier used in some steps, and by taking subtotals after each successive
operation. The mathematical procedures can be carried out in existing computers
long in use, no new machinery being necessary. Furthermore, as noted, the proce-
dures can also be performed without a compter. Id. at 66-67.
26. Id. at 67. The Court was relying on the Supreme Court decision in Funk
Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Co., 333 U.S. 127 (1947), wherein the Court stated "patents
cannot issue for the discovery of the phenomena of nature ... ." Id. at 130. Such
discoveries are "manifestations of laws of nature, free to all men and reserved ex-
clusively to none." Id.
27. However, the Court in Benson was careful to point out that the decision
did not prevent all patenting of computer programs:
It is said that the decision precludes a patent for any program servicing a
computer. We do not so hold. It is said that we have before us a program
for a digital computer but extend our holding ... to analog computers.
We have, however, made clear from the start that we deal with a program
only for digital computers. It is said we freeze process patents to old tech-
nologies, leaving no room for the revelations of the new, onrushing tech-
nology. Such is not our purpose.
409 U.S. at 71.
28. 425 U.S. 219 (1976).
29. Id. at 230. The Johnston Court denied the patentability of this computer
program on the unobviousness standard holding that one skilled in the art of
bookkeeping systems would have been aware of the nature of the extensive use of
data processing in the banking industry, thus revealing the Court's unwillingness
to extend patent protection to one who had arguably created an innovation in data
processing and bank bookkeeping.
30. 437 U.S. 584 (1978).
31. As the Flook Court explained, an alarm limit signals the presence of an ab-
normal condition during the catalytic conversion process, signaling either ineffi-
ciency or perhaps danger in the system. As the process fluctuates, it is necessary
its holding in Benson, denied the patent application. 32 With three
justices dissenting,33 the Court held that the presence of post-so-
lution activity 34 updating the alarm limit would not take the case
out of the Benson precedent so that such claim involved non-stat-
utory subject matter.35 The Court strongly suggested that the
computer program area required congressional legislation.36
B. The CCPA decision in the Bergy Case
It was igainst the foregoing backdrop that the Court of Custom
and Patent Appeals (CCPA) prepared its second opinion in the
companion cases of In re Bergy37 and In re Chakrabarty.3 8 This
to update the alarm limits periodically, and the applicants claim utilized an al-
gorithm in a computer program to do the updating. Id. at 585.
32. Id. at 590. The Court noted that:
Respondent correctly points out that this language of Benson does not ap-
ply to his claims. He does not seek to "wholly preempt the mathematical
formula" since there are uses of his formula outside the petrochemical
and oil refining industries that remain in the public domain. And he ar-
gues that the presence of specific "post solution" activity-the adjustment
of the alarm limit to the figure completed according to the formula--distin-
guishes this case from Benson and makes his process patentable. We can-
not agree.
Id.
33. Justices Stewart and Rehnquist and Chief Justice Burger dissented.
34. See note 32 supra.
35. 437 U.S. at 590. The Court felt that the notion that post-solution activity
transformed an unpatentable principle into a patentable process exalted form over
substance. The Court was reluctant to grant a patent, thereby setting a precedent
for anyone to simply attach a form of post-solution activity to any mathematical
formula to earn a patent, noting that even the Pythagorean theorem, solved and
applied to surveying techniques, would thereby become patentable.
36. Id. at 584. The Court was reluctant to grant a patent in the relatively
youthful computer industry but noted that their decision should not be inter-
preted to mean that patent protection of certain novel and useful computer pro-
grams would not promote the progress of science and the useful arts, or that such
protection is socially undesirable. "Difficult questions of policy concerning the
kinds of programs that may be appropriate for patent protection and the form and
duration of such protection can be answered by Congress on the basis of current
empirical data not equally available to this tribunal." Id. See also Deep South
Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp., 406 U.S. 518, 531 (1971), in which the Supreme Court
noted that patent rights should not be expanded by modifying or overruling prior
cases unless such expansion is based on more than inference from ambiguous
statutory language.
37. 596 F.2d 952 (C.C.P.A. 1979). The Supreme Court had previously granted
certiorari from the CCPA in In re Bergy, a patent case involving man-made living
microorganisms, pending before the Supreme Court at the time Flook was decided
on June 22, 1978. On June 29, 1978, in an unusual move, the Supreme Court va-
cated the Bergy CCPA judgment and remanded it to the CCPA in light of the anti-
patent decision in Flook. Parker v. Bergy, 438 U.S. 902 (1978). It appeared proba-
ble at the time that the Court was referring to the issue of nonpatentable types of
subject matter, such as laws of nature. It seemed as if the Court was suggesting
that man-made microorganisms and computer related laws were nonpatentable
subject matter under 35 U.S.C. § 101 and the following sections, and that an act of
Congress might be needed for patentability.
38. 596 F.2d 952 (C.C.P.A. 1979).
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second CCPA decision, which ultimately upheld the patents of
both Bergy and Chakrabarty, is over fifty pages long, and was
written with the clear expectation that the case would return to
the Supreme Court for a thorough review. The decision is ex-
haustive, and delves into the legislative history and structure of
the 1952 Patent Act, plant patent legislation, and many related
factors and legal precedents. It seemed to be in the nature of an
appellate brief, covering nearly all of the legal aspects of the case,
with many points being directed to the undesirability of requiring
that Congress enact new legislation to cover new developments
such as man-made living organisms or methods using computer
programs.39
C. Three Pro-Patent Decisions of the United States Supreme
Court
In Diamond v. Chakrabarty,40 the Supreme Court upheld the
CCPA decision on the patentability of living microorganisms.
Less than two weeks later, the Supreme Court rendered a second
pro-patent decision in Dawson Chemical Co. v. Rohm and Haas.41
The Court held that there was no patent misuse in the refusal by
a patent owner to license competitors under a patent involving a
use of an unpatentable chemical as a herbicide.42 Both decisions
were rendered by a strongly divided court; a narrow five-to-four
majority prevailed in each. In both cases, the majority opinions
set aside the monopoly view of patents and recognized the patent
system as a beneficial and worthwhile social institution.43 In the
dissenting opinions of both of these cases, the nation's deep-
seated antipathy to monopolies was mentioned prominently."
39. It must be remembered that Judge Rich, who rendered the decision in this
case, was also on the drafting committee of the 1952 Patent Act.
40. 447 U.S. 303 (1980).
41. 448 U:S. 176 (1980).
42. Id. at 182. The herbicide in question, propanil, was itself unpatentable, but
respondents Rohm and Haas had obtained a patent on the method or process for
applying propanil to inhibit the growth of undesirable plants. Id.
43. Id. at 176. "In our view the provisions of the Patent Act effectively confer
upon the patentee, as a lawful adjunct of his patent rights, a limited power to ex-
clude others from competition ... ." Id. at 201. See also note 10 supra.
44. 448 U.S. at 230 (White, J., dissenting). "Respondent's conduct in this case
clearly constitutes patent misuse ... because respondent refuses to license
others to use its patented process unless they purchase from it unpatented
propanil." Id. The dissent also stated: "The Court offers reasons of policy for its
obvious extension of patent monopoly, but whether to stimulate research and de-
velopment in the chemical field it is necessary to give patentees monopoly control
In a third pro-patent decision, Diamond v. Diehr,45 decided less
than nine months after the Chakrabarty and Rohm and Haas de-
cisions, the Supreme Court upheld a patent on an industrial pro-
cess which included a computer program. This decision was also
rendered by a narrow five-to-four majority.46 The principal signifi-
cance of the Diehr case is that the United States Supreme Court
has finally determined that at least some subject matter involving
computer programs may be patented.47
Within a week after the Diehr decision, an evenly divided
Supreme Court48 upheld another computer decision of the CCPA
in Diamond v. Bradley.49 The CCPA had heldO that the claimed
invention involved a combination of hardware elements and did
not preempt the use of an unpatentable mathematical algorithm,
as had been forbidden in the earlier Benson decision.
D. Summary of Case Review
In recent years, up to the time of Chakrabarty and Diehr deci-
sions, the United States Supreme Court had rarely affirmed the
CCPA in patent cases, and had seldom found patentable subject
matter in any invention. However, the Supreme Court has now
begun to affirm CCPA decisions upholding patents, emphasizing
the positive aspects of encouraging invention and research and
development which result from the patent system.
E. The Two Step Test for Patentability of Computer-Related
Inventions
The CCPA had enunciated a two-step test for patentability in
the companion decisions of In Re Freeman51 and In Re Walter.5 2
over articles not covered by their patents is a question for Congress to de-
cide. . . ." Id. at 240 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
45. 450 U.S. 175 (1981).
46. It is interesting to note that in each of the three cases different groups of
Justices formed the majority.
47. Id. at 187. In perhaps the strongest pro-patent statement to that date, the
Court held: "a claim drawn to subject matter otherwise statutory does not become
nonstatutory simply because it uses a mathematical formula, computer program
or digital computer." Id.
48. Chief Justice Burger abstained.
49. 450 U.S. 381 (1981).
50. In re Bradley, 600 F.2d 807 (C.C.P.A. 1979).
51. 573 F.2d 1237 (C.C.P.A. 1978). The exact two-step test was articulated as
follows:
First, it must be determined whether the claim directly or indirectly re-
cites an "algorithm" in the Benson sense of that term, or a claim which
taken to recite an algorithm clearly cannot wholly preempt an algorithm.
Second, the claim must further be analyzed to ascertain whether in its en-
tirety it wholly preempts that algorithm.
Id. at 1245.
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The test first involves a determination of whether the claims are
actually directed to a formula, equation, or mathematical al-
gorithm. If the answer to this first question is in the negative, the
claims involve statutory subject matter and there is no need to
proceed to the second test for patentability. However, if the an-
swer to the first question is in the affirmative, one must deal with
the second step of the test, which asks whether the claims, taken
in their entirety, wholly preempt the mathematical algorithm
from use in all fields.
In addition to clarifying the second step of the test announced
in the Freeman decision, the Walter decision clarified the guide-
lines for determining patentability of existing patent claims. The
guidelines are also useful in considering how to draft patent
claims. Specifically, assuming that the claims do define a mathe-
matical algorithm, if the implementation of the algorithm is
couched in terms which either define the structural relationship
between physical elements in a claimed apparatus or refine or
limit steps in the process for which the patent is being sought, the
claim will probably be patentable.5 3 If the end product of the pro-
cess is merely a number, however, as in Benson and Flook, the
claims will normally be found invalid as involving nonstatutory
subject matter.54 On the other hand, if a claimed invention pro-
duces a physical thing, such as a noiseless seismic trace as in the
Walter case, the fact that it is expressed in numerical form will
not make the claim nonstatutory.55
52. 618 F.2d 758 (C.C.P.A. 1980). In this case, the court expanded on the Free-
man holding, and analyzed the crucial second step of the test.
Once a mathematical algorithm has been found, the claim as a whole
must be further analyzed. If it appears that the mathematical algorithm is
implemented in a specific manner to define structural relationships be-
tween the physical elements of the claim ... or to refine or limit claim
steps . . ., the claim being otherwise statutory, the claim passes muster
under 101. If, however, the mathematical algorithm is merely presented
and solved by the claimed invention, as was the case in Benson and Flook,
and is not applied in any manner to physical elements or process steps, no
amount of post-solution activity will render the claim statutory; nor is it
saved by a preamble merely reciting the field of use of the mathematical
algorithm.
Id. at 767 (emphasis in original).
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. In re Johnson, 589 F.2d 1070, 1078 (C.C.P.A. 1978). The Johnson court dis-
tinguished the mathematical formula in Flook by noting that the products pro-
duced by Johnson's claimed processes were new, noiseless seismic traces
recorded on a record medium and "not mere mathematical values." Id.
To summarize, the more closely a claim is to being a pure math-
ematical algorithm, the more likely it will be held as unpatent-
able. However, the presence of novel structural limitations or
novel process steps where there is a physical change of state or
quality tends to make a claim patentable.
III. STATUTORY CHANGES TO THE 1976 COPYRIGHT ACT
In order to fully understand the meaning of the December 12,
1980 statutory changes to the 1976 Copyright Act, a brief detour
into the history of computer software copyright is necessary. Pro-
tection for computer programs under the earlier 1909 Copyright
Act wds uncertain. The uncertainty stemmed in part from a
landmark copyright decision of the United States Supreme Court,
White-Smith Music Publishing Co. v. Apollo Co.56 This decision
involved a player piano roll having a pattern of openings5 7 which
caused a piano to play a certain musical composition. The deci-
sion held that the player piano roll did not infringe a copyright on
the original sheet music for the composition on the basis that the
music on the piano roller could not be "read" or was not "eye
readable."5 8 Apparently, White-Smith was adopted into the 1909
Copyright Act implicitly.59 The repercussions from White-Smith
were felt even as late as 1973 when the Supreme Court stated in
Goldstein v. California6o that copyrighting sheet music would not
prohibit unauthorized recording of the original compositions
under the applicable 1909 Federal Statute. Taken together, these
two cases imply that since computer programs represent tangible
expressions of intellectual labor, they are copyrightable, but copy-
rights on source programs will not prevent the unauthorized du-
plication of the programs on punched cards or magnetic tapes
because such machine copies would not be deemed as "infringing
copies" upon the source programs.8 1
Even though there was confusion under the 1909 Act as to what
protection a copyrighted program would be given, the Register of
56. 209 U.S. 1 (1908).
57. The paper roll in a player piano is analogous to programs which have often
been implemented by punched cards.
58. Justice Day held in White-Smith that a musical composition "is not suscep-
tible of being copied until it has been put in a form which others can see and read
since a copy is "'a reproduction or duplication of a thing which comes so near to
the original as to give every person seeing it the idea created by the original."' 209
U.S. at 17. In a reluctant concurring opinion Justice Holmes stated: "On principle
anything that mechanically reproduces that collocation of sounds ought to be
made a copy, or, if the statute is to narrow, ought to be made so by a further
act. . . ." Id. at 20.
59. See 1 NndVMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 2.03[B] [1] (1981).
60. 412 U.S. 546 (1973).
61. See Pope and Pope, supra note 14, at 546.
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Copyrights declared that software would be accepted for deposit
and registration. 62 The Copyright Office allowed registration of
software even though copyrightability was doubtful because of
the Office's policy of resolving doubtful issues in favor of registra-
tion whenever possible.63
The situation that existed under the 1909 Act as to whether pro-
grams were copyrightable subject matter and the scope of protec-
tion afforded by such copyrights became an issue because of the
impending enactment of the 1976 Copyright Act. It had been
hoped that the 1976 Copyright Act would resolve the difficulties
surrounding the copyrighting of computer programs and the
scope of protection thus afforded. However, due to a disagree-
ment between the House and the Senate,64 section 117 was in-
cluded in the Act. Section 117 of the 1976 Copyright Act, effective
January 1, 1978, codified prior law with respect to computer pro-
grams. 65 In effect, Congress declared a moratorium on further
legislative action regarding copyright status of computer pro-
grams and maintained the status quo of protection that had been
available under the 1909 Act until further notice.
During this time, a special commission, the National Commis-
sion on New Technological Uses of Copyright Works (CONTU),
was created in 1974 under the auspices of the Library of Congress
to study the problem of protecting computer programs. 66 The
CONTU Report recommended that section 117 be replaced with
two provisions. These provisions were ultimately adopted on De-
cember 12, 1980.67 In order to see how the CONTU recommenda-
tions changed the previous section 117, and thus the protection of
62. See Cary, Copyright Registration for Computer Programs, 11 COPYRIGHT
Soc'Y U.S.A. BuLL. 361 (1964).
63. Id.
64. The House clearly indicated an intent to protect computer programs
through copyright. H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 54, reprinted in [1976]
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5659, 5667. The intent of the Senate at the time of the
passage of the 1976 Copyright Act was unclear. S. REP. No. 473, 94th Cong., 1st
Sess. 54 (1975).
65. Section 117 was first introduced in the Copyright Revision Bill of 1969. S.
543, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., 115 CONG. REC. 1382 (1969). Section 117 was agreed upon
by interested parties as a means of permitting passage of the revision bill without
committing Congress to a position on the computer issue until more study could
be undertaken. H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 116, reprinted in [1976]
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5659, 5661.
66. Act of Dec. 31, 1974, Pub. L No. 93-573, § 201, 88 Stat. 1873 (1974).
67. It is important to note that a lengthy and forceful dissent was filed by
Commissioner Hersey. CoNTU, FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON
NEW TECHNOLOGICAL USES OF COPYRIGHTED WORKS 10 (1979). For a good synopsis
computer programs, the exact wording of each section is of con-
siderable interest and will be set forth here, with the original
wording appearing first: 117. Scope of exclusive rights: Use in
Conjunction with Computers and Similar Information Systems
Notwithstanding the provisions of section 106 through 116 and 118, this
title does not afford to the owner of copyright in a work any greater or
lesser rights with respect to the use of the work in conjunction with auto-
matic systems capable of storing, processing, retrieving, or transferring in-
formation, or in conjunction with any similar device, machine, or process,
than those afforded to works under the law, whether Title 17 or the com-
mon law or statutes of the State, in effect on December 31, 1977, as held
applicable and construed by a court in an action brought under this
title.68
Now, the new statute, identified as H.R. 6933, and effective in
December, 1980, included the following relative to Title 17:
SEC. 12 (a) Section 101 of Title 17 of the United States Code is
amended to add at the end thereof the following new language:
A "computer program" is a set of statements or instructions to be used
directly or indirectly in a computer in order to bring about a certain result.
(b) Section 117 of Title 17 of the United States Code is amended to
read as follows:
117. Limitations on exclusive rights: Computer programs
Notwithstanding the provisions of section 106, it is not an infringement
for the owner of a copy of a computer program to make or authorize the
making of another copy or adaptation of that computer program provided:
(1) that such a new copy or adaptation is created as an essential step
in the utilization of the computer program in conjuction with a machine
and that it is used in no other manner, or
(2) that such new copy or adaptation is for archival purposes only and
that all archival copies are destroyed in the event that continued posses-
sion of the computer program should cease to be rightful.
Any exact copies prepared in accordance with the provisions of this sec-
tion may be leased, sold, or otherwise transferred, along with the copy
from which such copies were prepared, only as part of the lease, sale, or
other transfer of all rights in the program. Adaptations so prepared may
be transferred only with the authorization of the copyright owner.69
It can be seen that the original section 117 has been rewritten.
It no longer merely preserves the status quo for computer pro-
gram rights as available under the pre-1978 law. The new section
117 deals with an entirely different subject: the right of an owner
of a computer program to make a copy of a computer program,
with certain restrictions, apparently to permit normal use and ar-
chival protection to the program.
Apart from the specific provisions of the new section 117, the ef-
fect of the substitution is to make one important change in the
law, and raise questions about a second. First, computer pro-
of Commissioner Hersey's views see Comment, Copyright Protection for Computer
Programs, 47 TEN. L. REv. 809 (1980).
68. 17 U.S.C. § 117 (1976) (amended by 17 U.S.C. § 117 (1980)) (emphasis
added).
69. Id.
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grams are now clearly recognized as copyrightable subject matter
by Congress and are specifically included in the 1976 Copyright
Act. Second, cancellation of the original Section 117 might, in
view of section 301 of the 1976 Act, the preemption statute, be con-
strued as abrogating trade secret and unfair competition causes of
action.
Returning to the first point, it may be noted that even though
the House felt that some programs could be copyrighted,70 no-
where in the original 1976 Copyright Act were programs men-
tioned. The Copyright Office did not, however, find any difficulty
in determining that the 1976 Act included programs as copyright-
able subject matter.71 But now, with the new changes in section
117, programs are specifically mentioned.72
One effect of the amendment was to unequivocally overrule the
out-dated White-Smith Publishing Co. v. Apollo Co. 73 decision as
to computer programs. As noted above, this is the famous case in
which the U.S. Supreme Court held that a piano roll did not in-
fringe a sheet music copyright, although both would produce the
same "collocation of sounds."74 The White-Smith decision was
based on the out-dated notion that there should be a significant
difference in the treatment of eye-readable and non eye-readable
material; thus it is a significant step that this archaic concept in
the computer program infringement area has finally been
eliminated.75
70. H. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2nd Sess. 54 (1976) specifically states that
computer programs are appropriate matter for copyright "to the extent that they
incorporate authorship in the programmer's expression of original ideas as distin-
guished from the ideas themselves." Id.
71. Marybeth Peters, Senior Attorney Advisor in the Copyright Office, has
written in her General Guide to the Copyright Act of 1976:
Computer programs. Although they are not mentioned as copyrightable
subject matter in section 102(a) and they are not referred to explicitly in
the definition of "literary works" in Section 101, a careful reading of the
new law with the legislative report makes it clear that computer programs
are "software" is within the subject matter of copyright. The definition of
"literary works" refers to work expressed in "words, number, or other ver-
bal or numerical symbols or indicia." Cited in Bigelow, Copyrighting Pro-
grams-1978, 3 COMPUTER L. SERVICE REP. 4-3, art. 4, at 3.
72. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 117 (1976).
73. 209 U.S. 1 (1908).
74. Id. at 20.
75. It may be noted that the language of 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) states: "Copyright
protection subsists, in accordance with this title, in original works of authorship
fixed in any tangible medium or expression, now known or later developed, from
which they can be perceived reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either di-
rectly or with the aid of a machine or device .... This language would seem to
With respect to the second question regarding the effect of the
cancellation of the original section 117, it may be noted that trade
secret and unfair competition causes of action had clearly been
preserved under the original section. There has been some con-
cern that these possible causes of action for computer program
subject matter might no longer be available in view of section 301
of the 1976 Act, the preemption section of the new copyright law.7 6
This preemption section reads as follows:
17 USC Section 301 Preemption with Respect to Other Laws
(a) On and after January 1, 1978, all legal or equitable rights that are
equivalent to any of the exclusive rights within the general scope of copy-
right as specified by section 105 in works of authorship that are fixed in a
tangible medium of expression and come within the subject matter of
copyright as specified by section 102 and 103, whether created before or af-
ter that date and whether published or unpublished, are governed exclu-
sively by this title. Thereafter, no person is entitled to any such right or
equivalent right in any such work under the common law or statutes of
the State.
The scope of the preemption section set forth above is some-
what indefinite, 77 and a number of persons expressed concern
that repeal of the prior section 117 might mean that unfair compe-
tition and trade secret rights might now be lost. However, the leg-
islative history involving the repeal of the original section 117 is
explicitly contra, with counsel for the cognizant legislative com-
mittee and counsel for the Copyright Office both stating that state
remedies, such as those involving trade secrets or unfair competi-
tion, were not being limited or preempted by the change.
The Goldstein case 78 included a lengthy discussion of federal
preemption under the pre-1978 copyright law, and its holding is of
interest because the federal copyright law had not preempted a
California criminal statute relating to record piracy. The moder-
ately narrow view relative to federal preemption in the copyright
field, as enunciated in Goldstein, supports the position that trade
overrule White-Smith in general but, as mentioned, there is now no doubt White-
Smith has no validity regarding noneye-readable computer programs. H.R. REP.
No. 94-1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 52 (1976) states: "it makes no difference what
form, manner, or medium of fixation may be whether it is words, numbers, notes,
sounds, pictures, or any other graphic or symbolic indicia, whether embodied in a
physical object written, printed, photographed, sculptural, punched, magnetic, or
any other stable form, and whether it is capable of perception directly or by
means of any machine or device "now known or later developed." See 1 NIDMER,
NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 2.03[B] (1981).
76. For a detailed discussion of the application and the history of the federal
preemption doctrine see Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 552-60 (1972).
77. The intent of Congress in enacting section 301 is set forth in HouSE COMM.
ON THE JUDICIARY, COPYRIGHT LAw REVISION H.R. REP. No., 94th Cong., 2d Sess.
129-33 (1976). See also Allied Artists Picture Corp. v. Rhode, 496 F. Supp. 408
(1980), for a good discussion of section 301.
78. 412 U.S. 546 (1973).
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secret and unfair competition relief has not been preempted as a
result of the new changes.
IV. TRADE SECRET PROTECTION
Trade secret protection will only be mentioned to the extent
necessary to point out that as an alternative method of protection
for computer programs, it has retained its strength and viability.
First, it is noted that the continued validity of trade Secret protec-
tion was confirmed in the recent past by a rare unanimous deci-
sion of the U.S. Supreme Court in Aronson v. Quick Point Pencil
Co.79 It is further noted that the 1976 Copyright Act states that
copyrights arise or subsist upon creation and reduction to tangi-
ble form.80 Therefore, publication, which might destroy the trade
secret, with notice, is not necessary to establish copyright
protection.
It is noted in passing that the definition of "publication" under
section 101 of the 1976 Act includes "distribution of copies ... by
rental, lease or lending."8 1 It would appear possible, therefore,
that the leasing of computer programs, even with suitable confi-
dentiality provisions included in the lease, could be considered to
constitute a "publication," which might destroy trade secret
rights.
V. REGISTRATION OF COPYRIGHTS
Copyright protection is invoked by notice, but certain statutory
benefits, including the right to bring suit, accrue from the filing or
the registration of a copyright in the U.S. Copyright Office. In
computer program situations, the Copyright Office, has indicated
that it prefers to register the underlying "source code" and the
"object code" rather than only the latter.8 2 In this connection, it is
79. 440 U.S. 257 (1978).
80. 17 U.S.C. § 102 (1976).
81. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1976).
82. Source code is typically the first encoded form of a program. A short ex-
ample of source code is:
RD-MASTER
READ GL-MASTER-IN AT END GO TO EOJ-MAS COMP-COM.
IF CC-NUMBER LESS THAN GL-COM PERFORM
RD-COMP-CTRL GO TO COMP-COM.
IF CC-GLP15 = 0 GO TO RD-MASTER
MOVE CC-MO-END DATE TO SLASHED DATE
MOVE CORRESPONDING SLASHED DATE TO WRK-DATE6.
MOVE R-WRK DATE TO GL-BALDT.
noted that in order to use most computer programs without
change, one would only need the object code; however, the source
code indicates how the program is built up, and it is necessary for
easy modification of the program. It is understood that the Copy-
right Office will give limited registration to an object code even if
the source code cannot be made available.
Also, as of the present writing, it is understood that the Copy-
right Office has no procedure for maintaining computer programs
in secrecy while proceeding to register the programs. Accord-
ingly, at such-time as formal copyright registration of a program is
sought, trade secret protection may no longer be available. In
some cases, however, where the program is lengthy, only selected
portions are required or requested for deposit in the Copyright
Office.
VI. RECENT VIDEO GAME COPYRIGHT DECISIONS
There have not been many decisions under the new copyright
act, as it only came into force on January 1, 1978, and it normally
takes more than two or three years for a federal case to be tried.
However, a preliminary injunction was granted in a copyright
case involving an "audiovisual display" for an electronic or video
game called "Scramble," despite the fact the underlying computer
program was not copyrighted.8 3
In two other more recent similar cases, however, the plaintiffs
Object code is machine-generated code. The source code is read by the computer
and compiled into object code, which may actually be used by the computer. A
simplified description of the difference between source code and object code is
that source code is "general" while object code is "specifically adapted" to the par-
ticular computer using the program. An example of the object code form of the
source code is:
58 10 C ODO
18 21
D2 02 2 021 C 059
58 FO 1 030
05 EF
50 10 D 1F8
58 80 D 1F8
58 50 C 024
07 F5
58 10 C 04C
07 Fl
D7 D3 E 6D40309
See Comment, supra note 5, at 180.
83. Only a videotape of the output was copyrighted and registered with the
Copyright Office. Since the underlying program itself was not copyrighted, ex-
tending protection from the output display to cover the underlying program be-
comes problematic. The Judge reasoned that the output display was an
audiovisual work, and the program was like the fim with the computer a projector.
Stern Elec. v. Kaufman, 669 F.2d 852 (2d Cir. 1982).
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were less successful, with their video games being considered
valid but not infringed. More specifically in Atari Inc. v. Amuse-
ment World Inc. ,84 the court found that defendant's "Meteor"
game did not infringe plaintiff's "Asteroids" game. In the case of
Atari, Inc. v. North American Philips Consumer Electronics,
Corp.,85 the district court refused to grant a preliminary injunc-
tion based on plaintiffs copyrighted "Pac-Man" maze-chase game,
based on the judge's opinion that plaintiffs were unlikely to pre-
vail on the infringement issue involving defendants' "K. C.
Munchkin" maze-chase game.
VII. COPYRIGHT PROTECTION FOR COMPUTER MEMORY CHIPS
As mentioned above, many computers now include digital pro-
gram information in semi-conductor chips. These are often in the
form of Programmable Read-Only Memory chips, or PROMS.
The following questions naturally arise: First, are these pro-
grams protectable by the copyright laws? And, secondly, if copy-
right protection is available, how would the manufacture of the
computer invoke protection? These questions were considered by
the Seventh Circuit in Data Cash Systems, Inc. v. J.S. & A. Group,
Inc. ,86 and more recently in Tandy Corporation v. Personal Micro
Computers, Inc.87 In Data Cash,88 the district court decision in-
cluded dicta to the effect that such chips would not be protectable
by the copyright laws; nevertheless, the Seventh Circuit held that
the chips would be subject to copyright protection. However, the
absence of a proper copyright notice barred recovery. In the
Tandy case, the defendant's motion for summary judgment based
on the proposition that copying a semiconductor chip is not a
"copy" of the underlying copyrighted program was denied.
84. [1981] COPYRIGHT L. REP. (CCH) 25,347.
85. No. 81 C 6434 (N.D. Ill., ified Dec. 4, 1981), reversed on appeal, No. 81-2920
(7th Cir., filed Mar. 2, 1982).
The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the decision of the dis-
trict court, and held that because the test for copyright infringement was based on
visual comparison, they were in as good a position to review the similarity of the
games. They concentrated upon the overall similarity of the characters in the two
games, rather than their specific differences, and felt that a preliminary injunction
against defendant's game was warranted. They were careful to note, however, that
this decision would not affect the decision on the merits.
86. 628 F.2d 1038 (C.C.P.A. 1980).
87. 524 F. Supp. 171 (N.D. Cal., 1981).
88. 480 F. Supp. 1063 (N.D. Ill. 1979).
In view of these cases, it would appear desirable to include a
proper copyright notice on electronic equipment including perma-
nent or read-only memory chips. In this way, copyright remedies
are preserved, and if infringement occurs, the copyright may be
registered and the infringer sued.
VIII. PROTECTION POSSIBILITIES
Various possibilities for protecting proprietary rights in com-
puters and computer programs have been outlined above, and the
possible effect of recent judicial and legislative changes has been
analyzed. It is clear that further case law development will occur.
However, certain practical steps to protect proprietary rights in
software and firmware include the following:
(1) Invoking TRADE SECRET protection with a suitable con-
fidentiality legend, before widespread distribution occurs;
(2) Putting a COPYRIGHT NOTICE on a program and men-
tioning "unpublished work" when both trade secret and copyright
protection are being invoked;
(3) Having PROPRIETARY NOTICES (trade secret and/or
copyright) printed out at the same time as the computer program
prints out or as the results of the program are printed out.
(4) Putting COPYRIGHTED NOTICES on Read Only Memo-
ries or electronic equipment labels;8 9
(5) Not calling program licenses "LEASES", since the lease of
a computer program may be construed as a publication which
could destroy trade secret protection; and
(6) In the patent area, the claims should emphasize the struc-
ture and the physical aspects of the particular system or the
method. Any mathematics should be characterized as being a
small part of the system, and claims should be presented so as to
not wholly preerpt a mathematical algorith. If control can be ac-
complished by a cam and a mechanical linkage, a "hard-wired"
electrical circuit, or other similar structure, these alternatives
should be mentioned in the patent specification.
IX. CONCLUSION
In summary, the recent decisions of the Supreme Court and the
amendment of section 117 of the Copyright Act of 1976 both ap-
pear to favor the protection of intellectual property rights in com-
puters and computer programs. In the patent field, at least some
types of subject matter involving computer programs are patenta-
ble, while in the copyright field, computer programs may be copy-
89. 628 F.2d 1038 (1980).
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righted, and even a noneye-readable computer program may
constitute a copyright infringement. Through the judicious use of
trade secret, copyright, and patent protection, appropriate protec-
tion for both computers and computer programs may be secured.

